Many of the attributes that make a good 'socially responsible' are credence attributes that cannot be learned by consumers either through search or experience. Consumers, then, use for their purchasing decisions 'noisy' information about these attributes obtained from potentially contradictory channels (media, advertisement, NGOs). In this paper we model such informational framework and show the positive relationship between the accuracy of the information transmitted to consumers and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We also show that a rm may be tempted to add noise to the information channel (through lobbying of the media), which might reduce the supply of the CSR attributes and even harm the rm itself (with lower pro ts). It might then be pro table to the rm to commit ex-ante to not manipulate the information regarding the rm's business practices (e.g., with a partnership with an NGO). Finally, we extend our model to a competition framework endogenizing the number of rms active in the CSR segment. We show both that in more transparent markets a larger number of rms will be CSR, and that in a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given number of CSR rms.
Many of the attributes that make a good or a service \green" or, more generally, socially responsible, are credence attributes, not directly observable by consumers, who cannot learn about them either through search or experience (Nelson, 1970; Tirole, 1988; Baron, 2011) . Examples of such attributes are numerous: the conditions under which the product is produced (including any externalities associated with production, e.g. pollution and how workers are treated and how well they are paid), hidden hazards associated with consumption of the product, etc.
This asymmetry of information between a rm and its customers (and other stakeholders) regarding the rm's business practices poses a threat to the viability of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 1 CSR is mainly driven by demand of "conscious" consumers (namely, consumers who value one of these CSR credence attributes, and are willing to pay a higher price for a good that includes them) and, thus, the level and accuracy of the information available to consumers is key. 2 Absent credible information, the market might fail to provide the credence attributes valued by consumers: if consumers are uncertain about the attributes of the good, then they might not be willing to pay a premium for it and, thus, rms will not supply such attributes in the rst place (Akerlo , 1974) . Thus, the level of credible information available to consumers ( rm's stakeholders in general) with respect to rm's business practices is key in the development of CSR. And the purpose of this paper is precisely to study the role of informational issues in the promotion of CSR. More speci cally, we want to analyze: (i) In which way the level of information accuracy (or lack of it) in the market impacts in the ability and incentives of rms to invest in corporate social responsibility. We consider that consumers receive information from several channels (with potentially contradictory messages; e.g. from the media, NGOs, and rms themselves) and that they aggregate it in a noisy signal.
1 By corporate social responsibility we denote those \voluntary actions that rms take over and above compliance with minimum legal requirements, to address both its own competitive interests and the interests of the wider society" (as de ned by the UKs Department of Trade and Industry).
2 Evidence regarding the valuation by some conscious consumers on some credence attributes (and who are willing to pay a higher price for them) can be found in relation to the labor conditions of a rm (Hiscox and Smyth, 2009) , to charity linked products (Elfenbein and McManus, 2007) , or the environmental friendliness of a product (Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2009 ). See also, for instance, Mohr et al., 2001 , and Murray and Volgel, 1997) .
to invest in social responsibility, and we do so considering di erent levels of market competition among CSR rms.
(ii) How information about the behavior of the rm is produced and the incentives of agents to provide it. The number of agents that (may) play a role in the transmission of information to consumers on businesses' practices is wide; in particular, we focus on the incentives of a rm to manipulate the information provided to consumers (through advertisement, media, etc.) and the consequences it has on CSR.
(iii) The role of regulation and, specially, other decentralized institutional arrangements such as a rm's partnership with an NGO, in order to promote transparency and indirectly foster CSR. 3 Our modelling framework thus allows us to discuss in which way the accuracy of the information that consumers receive in uences the incentives of rms to be CSR, speci cally by investing in a clean and more expensive technology (rather than in the standard, dirty and cheaper one).
We do the analysis rst in the benchmark model in which only a single rm may di erentiate and become CSR, and then also in a framework where we endogenize the number of rms that may di erentiate and become CSR. When competition in CSR is considered, in addition to the impact of market transparency, we analyze the e ect that the intensity of competition (e.g. a la Bertrand v. collusive pricing) has on the overall industry's level of CSR. We show that, intuitively, both in the single rm as well as in the multiple rms framework, the higher the accuracy of the information provided to consumers on the true technology used by the rm (higher market transparency), the more incentives rms have to invest in social responsibility by investing in the clean technology. Thus, with higher market transparency, the number of rms that will be CSR is larger. The intuition is straightforward: only when there is enough information regarding the 3 An example of a transparency regulation is the European Union Directive 1999/94/EC which requires car makers to inform consumers on fuel economy and CO2 emissions of each car, as part of a "an overall Community strategy aimed [...] to reduce CO2 emissions, in particular those caused by passenger cars" (EU Directive 1999/94/EC). More speci cally, the labelling Directive requires the display of a label on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions on all new cars, the publication of national guides on the fuel e ciency and emission of CO2 of new cars, the display of posters at the dealerships and the inclusion of fuel e ciency and CO2 emissions information in printed promotional literature.
practices followed by rms, will consumers be willing to pay a higher price for a good labeled as socially responsible, in which case rms then have incentives to undertake socially responsible investments. 4 We also show that an increase in the intensity of competition among CSR rms decreases rms' incentives to invest in CSR (see Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, and Fernandez and Santalo, 2010) . The rationale is the so-called 'margin e ect' whereby more intense competition reduces the margin to be gained from an investment in CSR.
Our paper also includes an analysis of the informational channel between a rm and consumers (and possibly other agents).
More speci cally, we analyze the incentives of a rm to provide information and show that, if possible, the rm would manipulate (e.g., through advertisement) the information provided to consumers, hence increasing the probability of a non CSR behavior to go undetected. Such manipulation, however, by decreasing the accuracy of the information provided to consumers, might destroy the incentives of the rm to invest in CSR technologies.
Thus, the possibility to manipulate might eliminate the possibility of an equilibrium with the clean CSR technology.
Moreover, such manipulation might even harm the rm itself (lowering its pro ts) and, as a consequence, in some cases the rm would like to be able to commit ex ante not to manipulate the information provided to consumers (or, in other words, to increase the accuracy of the information provided to the public). For the rm, a way to commit might imply the involvement of the rm with a third party (such as an NGO) whose independent reputation might inform in a credible way that the rm does not manipulate and, thus, increase the accuracy of the signal received by consumers. This result might illustrate one of the rationales behind many partnerships we see in real life between rms and NGOs; e.g., Starbucks with the environmental NGO Conservation International, or the partnership between the multinational fruit company Chiquita with the NGO Rainforest Alliance. 4 The link between market transparency and CSR provides a rationale for many forms of transparency regulations present in the markets, such as the European Directive 1999/94/EC explained above. Such a Directive has the explicit aim both of increasing the consciousness of consumers and of allowing already conscious consumers to take informed decisions in accordance to their preferences, thus giving incentives to rms to sell less polluting cars. This ts well within our analysis since we also show that the more consciousness consumers are, the more incentives a rm has to invest in socially responsibility.
Related Literature
We model CSR as the supply by the rm of a socially responsible credence attribute attached to a private good (as in Baron, 2011 consequence, as we model in our framework, the only way CSR may be part of an equilibrium is when information is provided by a third party (such as the media, an NGO, etc.).
There exist in the market several institutions designed to cope with the lack of information by consumers on the credence attributes supplied by rms (i.e., the social responsibility of rms' practices). These institutions include certi cations, whether provided by a single rm (Bottega and de Freitas, 2008) or a group (club) of them (Baron, 2011) ; the information provided by activists such as NGOs (Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001) The impact of (the intensity of) competition on CSR by rms has been analyzed before. Bagnoli and Watts (2003) show that an increase in the intensity of competition in the industry (competition a la Bertrand instead of a la Cournot) reduces CSR by rms. Their result arises through the e ect that a reduction in competition in the (no-CSR) private good market has on the CSR segment: an increase in the price of the no-CSR segment increases the demand (and thus supply) of the CSR goods. This mechanism is not present in our framework where we always assume perfect competition in the no-CSR market segment. Our result, instead, is mainly driven by the 'margin e ect' as Fernandez and Santalo (2010) call it, whereby a more intense competition in the product market reduces margins obtained by rms and therefore their incentives to invest in CSR as a way to increase revenues. Fernandez and Santalo (2010) do analyze empirically the relationship between market competition and CSR by rms and show that CSR is positively correlated with market competition, evidence of the 'business-stealing e ect', that is, rms' incentives to invest in CSR in order to increase market share. Besley and Ghatak (2007) analyze the feasibility of CSR by rms when there is competition among CSR and no-CSR rms,
showing that CSR rms may indeed exist in a competitive equilibrium. Pecorino (2009, 2013) analyzes the impact that monopolistic competition have on by-product rms (that sell a private good and use their pro ts to provide a public good), showing that if the number of by-product rms is proportional to the size of the society, then public good provision (CSR) rises without bound as the society grows large. All such analysis assumes perfect information, while we are the rst to incorporate market transparency and informational uncertainty in the analysis of CSR as credence attributes and competition. Fisman et al. (2006) do look at the impact of competition in CSR in a reduced form model with only two rms; in their model a la Hotelling, however, CSR by the only rm that can be socially responsible is used as an observable signal of unobservable product quality (as in . This observability of CSR and its use as a signal of unobservable underlying product quality is also the focus of analysis in Elfenbein et al. (2012) . What is similar to our analysis is their assumption that di erent sellers present di erent disutilities from behaving opportunistically (analogous to our three types of xed costs of rms), which they correlate with the seller's utility from charitable giving, allowing for the observable charities to be used as a signal of unobservable product quality.
Our paper is also the rst one to discuss the incentives of a rm to invest in corporate social responsibility in a context in which the rm may manipulate the information provided to consumers. There are many papers dealing with the manipulation of information by agents 6 .
In the context of persuasive games, and within the literature of CSR, Lyon and Maxwell (2011) discusses 'greenwash', namely, the selective disclosure of positive information about a rm's social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions. Our analysis models in a reduced form the manipulation of information, and analyses its interaction with rm's incentives to invest in CSR and its corresponding social performance, something not done in Lyon and Maxwell (2011).
Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) also analyze the role that an NGO (activist) may play in a market for CSR credence goods. As we do, they nd that the presence of an activist may increase market transparency and, accordingly, may support equilibria with CSR which in the absence of the activist would not arise. Their analysis considers competition between two rms and one strategic activist that may monitor one rm and inform potential customers. In our framework with one rm, instead, the activist is rather passive, simply a commitment device to the rm; we do consider, however, that the rm may manipulate the information available to customers, an action that rms in Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) cannot do. Additionally, in our analysis with competition we are able to study the relationship between the level of competition in CSR and market transparency, an avenue not studied by Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) .
Finally, a recent and related paper to our single rm analysis is Bagnoli and Watts (2014) which presents a signaling game studying a rm's decision to engage in CSR, voluntarily report on it and purchase external assurance of the report. While Bagnoli and Watts (2014) follows a di erent modeling strategy (they use a reduced form of the market game), their results are similar to ours: incentives to engage in CSR depend on the accuracy of the information held by consumers, and this accuracy can be a ected by rms' actions (manipulation or voluntary reports) as well as by third parties that can sustain CSR separating equilibria. In the analysis of this separating equilibrium, they highlight the complementarity between voluntary and involuntary actions, while we focus on the impact of rm's commitment by means of third parties over total welfare.
In section 2 we present the benchmark model which we solve in section 3, obtaining and discussing proposition 1, 2 and 3, namely, the role of the accuracy of information and the consciousness of consumers in the promotion of CSR, as well as a welfare analysis. Next, in section 4, we endogenize information, rst by studying the rm's incentives to manipulate such information as well as its consequences, and second, by analyzing the incentives of a rm to commit not to manipulate in order to foster CSR. Section 5 endogenizes the number of rms that may be CSR, and discusses the impact of market transparency and intensity of competition on CSR. Finally, section 6 concludes.
The Benchmark Model
The model consists of a perfect competitive market in which rms sell an homogeneous good.
One rm among all may di erentiate from the others by attaching a credence attribute to this good. We consider that this rm may choose to produce with a cleaner (and more expensive) technology than the rest. In the economy there is a continuum of consumers who derive a warm glow utility from consuming the good produced with the clean technology. The technology used is private information of the rm, while all consumers (and the rm itself) receive the same noisy signal regarding the type of technology used by the rm.
Firms and Technologies
Competitive rms do not make pro ts, and the market price and the marginal cost of the homogenous good (produced with the dirty technology) are normalized to zero. One rm (henceforth, the rm) may di erentiate in the market by attaching a credence attribute to the good it sells. We model this by allowing the rm to choose a clean technology rather than the dirty technology with which the rest of the rms produce. The rm, thus, may choose with which technology t to produce, whether to produce the good with a clean technology (C) or with the dirty and standard technology (D), i.e. t 2 fC; Dg. The clean technology entails a xed cost F 0, whereas the dirty technology entails no xed cost. In either case, the marginal cost of production is 0.
The rm that can di erentiate may be one of three di erent types, depending on the size of the xed cost in which it incurs in case it uses the clean technology. 7 With ex ante probability This rm, as we analyze below, will be \strategic" regarding its decision on which technology to use, and will be the focus of our analysis. 8 The rm learns its type before the choice of the technology, and consumers do not observe the type of the rm. 9 7 In appendix B we also analyze the benchmark model with a continuous of types. 8 An alternative way to specify three di erent types of rms would be to relate them to managerial disutility from using a dirty technology (analogously to Elfenbeim et al., 2014, consideration of a seller's disutility from opportunistic behaviour). Some (altruist) managers would not be willing to use a dirty technology in any case, other (non-atruist managers) would not incur in any disutility from adopting the dirty technology, and (a bit altruist) strategic managerial types would make their choice regarding the technology depending both on their disutility from adopting the dirty technology and on market incentives. 9 In terms of modeling our framework is similar to Diamond (1989) . The symmetry of the non strategic types is assumed for saving notation and plays no role in the results.
Consumers
There is a mass of unit 1 of consumers with utility
where v is the valuation of the standard good, and g 2 f0; Gg is a consumer's valuation of the credence attribute attached to the good. Thus, g = G in case the the rm uses the clean technology, and 0 if the good consumed is produced by the rm using the dirty technology.
Let represent the type of the consumer with regard to his/her degree of consciousness; more speci cally, determines the warm-glow derived by the consumer from consuming the good with the credence attribute attached, such as a clean environment or no child labor (Andreoni, 1989).
Furthermore, we assume that is distributed over the interval [0; 1] with a distribution function H( ), and that the reliability function of the distribution, i:e H( ) = 1 H( ); is logconcave.
Finally, p is the price paid by the consumer.
Signals and Information
The technology e ectively used by the rm is not observable by the consumers. However, consumers (and the rm itself) receive the same public signal concerning the technology used by the rm, s, where s 2 fs C ; s D g. The realization of the public signal depends on the technology that the rm is using:
where 2 [0; 1]. That is, if the rm uses the clean technology, the signal will be s C with certainty. However, if the rm uses the dirty technology there is some noise and thus consumers may receive either signal realization. 10 Notice that represents the accuracy of the signal, with a higher implying a more informative signal. More speci cally, notice that with = 0 the signal is non-informative whatsoever since consumers never receive signal s D . 11 
The Market Game
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Nature chooses the type of rm, namely, the level of the xed cost F of the clean technology.
2. The rm chooses the technology with which it is going to produce, t 2 fC; Dg. The rest of the rms produce and sell the standard and dirty good (at zero price and cost).
3. Nature chooses the signal realization s 2 fs C ; s D g according to the information structure Pr (s j T ). Consumers and the rm observe the realization of the signal.
4. The rm sets its price p.
5.
Each consumer decides whether to buy or not from the rm. The alternative is to buy the standard dirty good from the competitive fringe (at zero price).
6. Pro ts are realized. 10 We can provide a rationale for this information structure based on news. Consider that the ratio between good and bad news about the rm determines the probability of signal realization, that is,
, where NG (NB) are good (bad) news. News are produced by the rm, likely to provide only good news, and other private actors (such as NGOs, the media, etc.), in which case it is natural to assume that are either biased in favor of the rm (for example due to advertisement), or committed to provide truthful information (such as NGOs). Under such behavior Pr (sC j C) = 1, since all agents will provide good news when the technology is the clean one, and Pr (sC j D) = 1 (there is some noise) because there is a con ict between neutral and biased actors, and hence there might be good and bad news.
11 This information structure simpli es the derivation of the results since a dirty signal realization is fully informative. Introducing noise when the clean technology is chosen (and making the dirty signal less informative) would not change the results as long as we could order the signals according to their informativeness (e.g.
) .
Demand
As usual, we solve the game backwards and, thus, start determining demand which depends on the marginal consumer that is indi erent between buying the good to the rm or buying the standard good from the competitive fringe (at zero price). Namely:
Then,
Thus, those consumers with will buy the "di erentiated" good from the rm, while those with < will buy the standard good. As a consequence, and given the distribution function of over [0; 1], the demand faced by the rm is 1 H(
We see that demand depends on the signal received by the consumer and the posterior probability that the technology chosen by the rm is the clean one. We analyze this further below.
Firm's Pro ts
The pro t of the rm (gross of xed cost, if any) is demand times price, namely,
Given this pro t function, and given the signal received by all consumers, which is the price set by the rm, and its posterior pro ts? We answer this question in Lemma 1 next, where we see that the price (and pro ts) of the rm depends on the public signal realization:
The price set by the rm is p (s) = Pr (C j s) G , whereas rm's pro ts (gross of xed
All proofs are in the appendix. On the one hand, if the public signal realization is s D , the posterior probability that the technology chosen by the rm is the clean one is zero. As a consequence, and since all rms are then homogeneous, the price then set by the rm is 0, i.e., the willingness that the consumer has to pay for the product when it believes that it is produced using the dirty technology (no credence attribute attached). In such a case, the rm's pro ts are 0.
On the other hand, if the public signal realization is s C , then they have a positive willingness to pay for the product and the price will no be longer 0. The optimal price (characterized in Lemma 1) is linear in the conditional probability that the clean technology has been used. As we will show in the next section, this conditional probability will be increasing in the accuracy of the signal. Given this optimal price, the more conscious consumers will buy from the rm, and the others will buy from the (rest of the) market. 12 It turns out that the marginal consumer (and consequently the demand) is independent of the accuracy of the signal , and only depends on the distribution of the consumer "consciousness" parameter, H( ). 12 We can interpret Lemma 1 as rms observing consumers' public signal realization (perceptions) and tayloring prices to them. But notice that, even if rms did not observe or had imperfect information regarding the realization of s, the same equilibrium would arise. This is because the dirty signal is fully informative. Then, a rm with a dirty technology and uncertain of the signal obtained by consumers would set the same price than a rm with a clean technology. This is so since if the signal turns out to be the bad one, the rm will obtain zero pro ts no matter the price set. Market equilibrium would be more di cult to characterize for alternative information structures, but it should deliver that a rm with a better perception from consumers would obtain higher pro ts, which is the only requirement that we need for our results. 13 To better understand the intuition of this result, we can rewrite the rm's objective function using the marginal consumer. We do so with a simple manipulation of the objective function,
; and a change of variable, = p Pr(Cjs)G ; obtaining:
Then, the solution of the rm's problem in terms of the optimal marginal consumer, 2 arg max ( ; s), coincides (and is independent of Pr (C j s)) with the solution of a standard optimal take-it or leave it o er, v 2 arg max [1 H (v) ] v, when the valuations are distributed according to H( ):
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Given this above, which will be the technology chosen by the rm in equilibrium? Or, in other words, is the rm going to invest in the clean technology? Since such a choice is private information of the rm, consumers are going to have beliefs on it based on the signal received.
Hence, solving the game requires solving for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As de ned in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes rule. Note the link between strategies and beliefs: the beliefs are consistent with the strategies, which are optimal given the beliefs.
Clearly, the choice of technology depends on the actual type of the rm. In any case, the type with F ! 1 will always choose the dirty technology while the type with F = 0 will always choose the clean technology. We then have left to discuss what the strategic type with 0 < b F < 1 is going to do. Our analysis will focus on the relevant case in which is larger than the xed cost of the clean technology, that is, b F < ; in other words, it would be optimal for the rm to produce with a clean technology under perfect information. 14 As it will be clear from the analysis below, if this condition is not met, in equilibrium strategic types will always produce with a dirty technology. We focus on pure strategies equilibrium, and we (need to) study when the strategic type is going to choose the clean technology (the socially responsible CSR equilibrium) and when it is going to choose the dirty technology (the not socially responsible NCSR equilibrium).
The Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR) Equilibrium
We denote as corporate socially responsible (CSR) the equilibrium in which the strategic type rm chooses the clean technology. In equilibrium it must be that priors and beliefs are consistent with strategies. Then, 14 This is a su cent condition to ensure that producing with the clean technology is e cient under perfect
in such a case (and since the F = 0 type by assumption also chooses the clean technology), priors (beliefs of consumers) are that the clean technology is chosen with probability For the rm to be optimal to choose the clean technology over the dirty one, it must be that the expected pro ts (before the realization of the public signal) when choosing the clean technology are larger than the pro ts using the dirty technology, i.e.
Let CSR (s) Pr (C j s) be the rm's pro ts in the case in which consumers anticipate that the strategic type chooses the clean technology (whereas as N CSR will stand for the case in which consumers believe that the strategic type has chosen the dirty technology) and the realization of the public signal on the technology chosen by the rm is s.
Using bayes rule, we obtain CSR (s D ) = 0 and CSR (s C ) = The expected pro ts are
since Pr (s C j C) = 1 and Pr (s D j C) = 0. On the other hand,
because Pr (s C j D) = (1 ) and CSR (s D ) = 0. Then, the incentive compatibility condition (4) over expected pro ts becomes
Plugging in the expression of the pro ts, we obtain the necessary condition for the existence of a CSR equilibrium
where recall that 2 [0; 1]. Notice that a necessary condition for the existence of a socially responsible equilibrium is that the xed cost b F is smaller than :
The Not Corporate Socially Responsible (NCSR) Equilibrium
The analysis of the NCSR equilibrium is analogous to the CSR equilibrium. Suppose now that the strategic type rm chooses the dirty technology. Then, in such a case, priors (beliefs by consumers) that a rm chooses the clean technology are 1 2 , whereas that a rm chooses the dirty technology are
2 . As we speci ed above, for notational purposes, let N CSR (s C ) = Pr (C j s C ) be the pro t of the rm (gross of xed costs) when the signal is good (s C ) and the strategic type rm has chosen the dirty technology. Using the bayes rule, we obtain N CSR (s C ) =
(1+ ) :
These pro ts are linked to the positive willingness to pay of consumers that is increasing in the accuracy of the signal. As in the previous case, when the realization of the public signal is bad the pro ts are zero, i.e. N CSR (s D ) = 0: Finally, the necessary condition for the strategic type to choose the dirty technology is that
For the same arguments than above, the incentive compatibility condition (5) can be written as
Plugging in the expression of the pro ts, we obtain the necessary condition for the NCSR equi-
Results
Once we have characterized the equilibrium of the game, we can analyze the impact of the accuracy of the consumers' information in the payo of the strategic rms and in the necessary conditions for the CSR and NCSR equilibria speci ed above.
Lemma 2
The expected pro ts of the strategic rm in the CSR equilibrium (NCSR equilibrium)
are increasing (decreasing) in the accuracy of the signal :
Lemma 2 shows that the necessary condition for the CSR equilibrium (NCSR equilibrium) is easier (more di cult) to be met when the accuracy of the signal is large.
Proposition 1 When the accuracy of information is small, the NCSR equilibrium is unique and the strategic rm chooses the dirty technology, whereas when the accuracy of information is large enough, the CSR equilibrium is unique, and the strategic rm chooses the clean technology.
For intermediate levels of accuracy, both strategies are part of an equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward. Only when there is enough information regarding the action followed by the rm, consumers will be willing to pay a higher price for a good labeled as socially responsible. Given that consumers' behavior depends on the information they hold, the rms' incentives to undertaking socially responsible actions also does. 15 Figure 1 illustrates the characterization of the equilibrium, plotting the gross (without xed costs) incremental profits of choosing the clean technology, (s C ); as a function of : These incremental pro ts are higher the more valuable is the clean signal s C . Then, CSR (s C ) and N CSR (s C ) are increasing in and CSR (s C ) > N CSR (s C ) for all ; since consumers anticipate that the strategic 15 In the accompanying working paper version of the current paper we include an appendix with a continuous types model which replaces the three types set (with F = 0, F = b F and F ! 1) by a continuous set of types (Calveras and Ganuza, 2015) . In particular, we assume that the clean technology entails a xed cost f 2 [0; 1], where f is distributed according to G(f ), whereas the dirty technology entails no xed cost; speci cally, we focus our analysis there on the uniform distribution, i.e. G(f ) = f . We show that the Bayesian equilibrium of that game is characterized by a cut-o type b f such that rms invest in the clean technology if f b f and not otherwise, and thus the level of CSR is described by G( b f ). In Calveras and Ganuza (2015) we nd that b f is increasing in , which implies that proposition 1 also holds with continuous xed types.
types choose the clean technology, and then their prior of a clean technology is higher and P (Cjs C ) increases. On the one hand, the condition for the CSR equilibrium in which strategic types have incentives to choose the clean technology, In a nutshell, we can state that the better information there is regarding the rm's practices, the more incentives the rm has to be CSR (to choose the clean technology).
[
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Now, we move to the welfare analysis of both equilibria. Total welfare is linear in the conditional probability that the clean technology has been used, in which case consumers derive utility G from the credence attribute attached to the good. Namely, total welfare is W Pr (C j s) minus the investment xed cost (if any), where
Similarly to above, we can interpret W as the (gross of xed costs) total welfare generated when the clean technology is used under perfect information. Finally, consumer surplus is the di erence between total welfare and rm's pro ts; namely, (W ) Pr (C j s). Notice that total welfare, pro ts and consumer surplus all depend on the actual equilibrium of the game, whether CSR or NCSR. This is explained in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Ex ante total welfare, pro ts, and consumer surplus are larger in the CSR equilibrium than in the NCSR equilibrium
This proposition shows that both the rm and consumers (and, therefore, total welfare) are better o in the CSR equilibrium than in the NCSR equilibrium. Notice that the accuracy of 16 As we are assuming that b F < ; is easy to check as it is predicted by the analysis of gure 1 that, = 2 b Proposition 3 means that, for instance, for any given value of xed cost of investment of the strategic type ( b F ), then e ; that is, the minimum level of informational accuracy required to sustain a CSR equilibrium is lower in a more conscious society. Analogously, for a given accuracy of the signal , this proposition means that e F b F ; that is, the CSR equilibrium can be sustained for a larger value of xed cost of investment in a more conscious society.
Endogenous information
In this section we rst study the incentives of the rm to manipulate the information and the impact that such manipulation has on the equilibrium and on welfare, rm's pro ts included.
And second, we analyze the incentives that some rms might have to commit unilaterally to a higher transparency by means, for instance, of a partnership with a NGO.
Manipulation
Consider the case in which the rm (by means of advertising, lobbying, etc.) can improve consumers' perception of the rm when the technology used is the dirty one. This means in our model that the rm can increase Pr (s C j D), namely, it decreases the accuracy of the information available to consumers, decreasing to 0 . We assume that this manipulation process is costless.
Then, the timing of the game goes as follows:
1. Nature chooses the type of rm, F .
2. The rm chooses the technology with which it is going to produce, t 2 fC; Dg. The rest of the rms produce and sell the standard good (at zero price and cost).
3. The rm either manipulates or not, m 2 fM; N M g; which is private information of the rm.
In case of manipulation, the rm increases Pr (s C j D), from 1 to 1 0 ; where 0 < . 5. The rm sets its price p.
6. Each consumer decides whether to buy or not.
7. Pro ts are realized.
Equilibrium with manipulation
Lemma 2 above shows that the expected pro ts of the strategic rm decrease with accuracy of information when it is using a dirty technology, and increase when it is using the clean technology. For the same token, manipulation is going to be used only by rms using a dirty technology. If the rm uses the clean technology, it is not interested in manipulation because, by assumption, the signal will be the clean one. 17 If the rm uses the dirty technology, manipulating increases rm's pro ts because taking in equilibrium the value of the signals as given, manipulation increases the probability that the signal is good, s C .
In short, then, manipulation makes it relatively more attractive to invest in the dirty technology, implying that it is more di cult to nd an equilibrium in which the strategic rm chooses the clean technology. The next proposition states this result.
Proposition 4
The possibility of manipulation reduces the set of parameters for which a CSR equilibrium can be sustained.
In particular, if the xed cost of the strategic type ( b F ) lies over the interval [
the possibility of manipulation eliminates the CSR equilibrium. The intuition goes as follows.
When manipulation is costless, the non strategic type with F = +1 will always manipulate. This worsens the value of the good signal and consequently makes less attractive the clean technology.
Moreover, as we said above, the possibility of manipulation makes it more pro table to the strategic type to deviate from the CSR equilibrium since it increases the probability that the signal is s C without incurring in the xed cost. Both e ects thus lead to make it more di cult that necessary conditions for the CSR equilibrium are met.
From proposition 2 above we know that manipulation (reducing ) reduces exante expected total welfare (including both consumer surplus and rm's pro ts), in the sense that it reduces the set of parameters for which a CSR equilibrium can be sustained. This result refers to an exante welfare analysis before types are realized. It is thus interesting to know what types of rms bene t from the possibility of manipulation. The non strategic type with F = 0 and the strategic type with b F such that they choose a clean technology independently of the possibility to manipulate decrease their pro ts because the value of the good signal is reduced. The non strategic type with F ! 1 and the strategic type with b F such that it chooses a dirty technology independently of the possibility to manipulate, increase their pro ts since increasing the probability a good signal through manipulation overcomes the loss of value of the good signal.
It is specially interesting the case in which the possibility of manipulation makes unfeasible the CSR equilibrium when it was possible without such manipulation. In such a situation, there are strategic types that choose a clean technology when manipulation is not possible, but when this possibility exists they then choose a dirty technology and reduce the accuracy to 0 afterwards. This, however, does not mean that these types are better o with manipulation; in fact, next Lemma states that some of these strategic types are worse o because of the possibility to manipulate.
Lemma 3
The possibility of manipulation may lead a strategic rm (that, absent such possibility, would choose the clean technology) to choose the dirty technology and then manipulate. Furthermore, some of these rms may show a reduction in their pro ts due to such manipulation.
This result is driven by the fact that manipulation decreases the value of a good signal, s C , and the switching rms considered in the Lemma obtain lower pro ts with the clean technology with the possibility of manipulation than without it. In the proof of Lemma 3 it is shown that, although using the dirty technology and manipulating is more pro table for these switching rms than using the clean technology with a devaluated good signal, for a subset of them these pro ts with manipulation are lower than using a clean technology in a setup without manipulation possibility with a valuable clean signal.
We have taken as given the outcome of the manipulation process that leads accuracy from to 0 and we have also assumed that this process was costless. In practice, however, manipulation may involve a cost, and 0 should be the solution to an optimization problem. In particular, as the cost of manipulation is likely to increase with the stringency of transparency regulatory measures, it is also likely then that more stringent transparency regulatory policies reduce the net bene ts of manipulation, reducing the distance between and 0 . 18 As a consequence, a more stringent transparency regulation that reduces the distance between and 0 enlarges the set of parameters for which a CSR equilibrium can be sustained. In other words, making transparency 18 Consider, for example, that the e ective reduction to 0 from is in fact the solution of the following problem, 0 2 arg max (D; M ) C( M ), where (D; M ) are the pro ts of using a dirty technology when the accuracy of the signal is M and C( M ) is the cost of manipulation that may include lobbying, advertisements, and also penalties imposed by the regulator. These penalties are likely to be larger the higher the manipulation M . As a consequence, a tougher regulation that involves, for example, higher nes and a higher marginal cost of manipulation, may lead to a higher 0 (lower level of manipulation).
regulation more strict increases the costs of manipulating the information making it less attractive for strategic types.
Commitment through external agents
The previous results imply that some rms may favor an increase in the transparency regarding their business practices (the choice of technology in our model). A higher transparency might be achieved through di erent institutional settings (e.g., through regulatory policies). In this section, we focus on the incentives that some rms might have to commit unilaterally to a higher transparency; namely, to commit not to manipulate the information that will be available to consumers regarding the technology choice of the rm. As we discuss in the following subsection,
an example of such a business strategy can be found in the many partnerships between rms and
NGOs whose logic lies in the role of the NGO as a an independent and reputable certi er of some of the rm's business practices.
To undertake such an analysis, consider the previous model with an additional period in which rms may choose to commit to not manipulate by incurring in a cost c (consider for example a partnership or auditing fee). It is natural to assume that this commitment is visible to consumers and that they update their valuation of the product using the commitment decision as well as the realization of the signal. Then, the timing of this new signaling game goes as follows:
2. The rm decides whether or not to commit to not manipulate, d 2 fCo; N Cg. This commitment decision is visible and entails a cost c 0.
3. The rm chooses the technology with which it is going to produce, t 2 fC; Dg. The rest of the rms produce and sell the standard dirty good (at zero price and cost).
4. If the rm has not committed in stage 2, it decides whether to manipulate or not, m 2 fM; N M g; which is private information of the rm. In case of manipulation, the rm increases Pr (s C j D), from 1 to 1 0 ; where 0 < .
5. Nature chooses the signal s 2 fs C ; s D g on the technology used by the rm according to the information structure determined by Pr (s C j t). Firms and consumers observe the realization of the public signal. Consumers update their beliefs using the signal realization and the rm's commitment decision, P (Cjs; d).
6. The rm sets its price p.
7. Each consumer decides whether to buy or not.
8. Pro ts are realized.
Equilibrium with commitment and manipulation
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game speci es the optimal strategy for every type (d F ; t F ; m F ) and a system of consumer's beliefs that, simplifying notation, we summarize in P (Cjs; d). Consumers observe the rm's decision over commitment, and update their beliefs over the type of the rm. They combine this information with the realization of the signal for obtaining the posterior P (Cjs; d). Since there might be a con ict between the realization of the signal and extreme values of the types' beliefs, we assume that independently of the beliefs, a bad signal realization always reveals the type of technology, namely P (Cjs D ; d) = 0:
As it is common in signaling games, there is a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria that depend on the set of parameters as well as on the belief system. Rather than fully characterizing all equilibria, we address the question of whether or not commitment may be a device for sustaining the CSR equilibria. In order to do that, we focus on the separating equilibrium in which the strategic type with b F > 0 and the non-strategic type F = 0 choose to commit, and the type F ! 1 chooses not to, and the strategic type chooses to invest in the clean technology. In such an equilibrium, when consumers observe no commitment they correctly anticipate that they are facing a type F ! 1 and, independently of the realization of the signal, they set a posterior P (Cjs; N C) = 0. Given this belief system, the pro ts of type F ! 1 are always zero. In this equilibrium, the relevant asymmetric information vanishes (there is still uncertainty over the type of the rm, with b F > 0 or with F = 0), since when consumers observe commitment and receive the clean signal, they learn with certainty that the technology is clean. Hence, the pro ts of the strategic type are Another condition of the equilibrium is that the cost of commitment is intermediate, neither
too large nor too small. On the one hand, it is intuitive that if c is very large, then commitment becomes a non pro table strategy. On the other hand, if c is too low, mimicking becomes easy for types that do not plan to invest in the clean technology, destroying the incentives to commit. In fact, in the Appendix C we show that if c = 0, any separating equilibrium fails to exist and only a pooling equilibrium arises. We also show then that only when 0 is large enough, the only equilibrium in pure strategies that satis es the intuitive criterium is the pooling equilibrium in which all types of rms follow a commitment strategy. Then, if c = 0, transparency regulation that reduces the distance between and 0 is a strategic substitute of self-commitment to transparency by rms.
Partnerships between rms and NGOs
The previous analysis shows that, under some circumstances, rms may have incentives to commit not to be able to manipulate the information available to consumers with regards to the technology used in production. In other words, to increase the transparency with regards to its choice of technology. It is our opinion that such result lies behind the rationale for many of the partnerships between a rm (or a group of rms) and an NGO (or a group of them) that we observe in many industries. 19 According to Yaziji (2004) , one of the strengths that NGOs have (as apposed to corporations) is`legitimacy' 20 . As Yaziji (2004) explains, and according to a poll conducted by the Edelman public relations rm, both Americans and Europeans said they found NGO spokespeople more credible than either a company's CEO or Public Relations representative. Some fraction of the public, specially in Europe, sees NGOs as dedicated rst 19 The rationales behind such partnerships may vary and are not con ned to the rationale presented in this paper. For instance, Brugman and Prahalad (2007) discuss such alliances between a rm and an NGO for the purpose of developing some entrepreneurship and business model in the developing world. Such a partnership allows rms and NGOs to share some knowledge and capabilities that are speci c to each one. 20 The other three are awareness of social forces, distinct networks and specialized technical expertise.
and foremost to serving an aspect of the general social welfare. This is what gives credibility to their positions regarding social issues as, e.g., are the environmental ones. Such`legitimacy' is precisely the reason why in our framework NGOs can be used by rms as a way to commit to the public (consumers) to a certain course of action and can increase the transparency of their actions. Furthermore, Yaziji (2004) also stresses that partnering with NGOs, and advertising it, can draw stricter scrutiny form the public, the press, the regulators, and so on than your company formerly received. Notice that such e ect of partnering with an NGO is analogous to increasing transparency in our framework, making it more di cult to manipulate the information.
Examples of such partnerships between a rm and an NGO abound. In the garment industry, for instance, the rm GAP, in its aim to try to ensure a proper treatment of workers in the factories that are part of its supply chain, provides two independent evaluations of GAP's factory inspection program by the NGOs Social Accountability International and Verite. In another example, the multinational rm Starbucks has developed a partnership with an NGO, environmental group Conservation International, with the aim of increasing transparency in their operations and assuring that the operations were done under sound conditions.
Competition in CSR
In this section we extend our model to a competition framework in order to study the e ect of information accuracy when the number of CSR rms is endogenized. As in the benchmark model, there is an homogenous good which is produced competitively with the dirty standard technology.
We now consider that any rm can position itself in the market segment for CSR goods by investing an exogenous amount k (this entry cost k might be interpreted, for instance, as the cost of advertisement). Only after positioning itself in the CSR segment, a rm learns its type (its xed cost of investing in the clean technology), and then decides whether to invest or not. To keep the model tractable, we ignore the moral hazard problem present in the benchmark model and we consider only the existence of non strategic types. 21 Thus, with probability e a rm's type is F = 0, while with a probability 1 e its type is F ! 1. Firms' types are independently and identically distributed. All 'active' rms (those that incurred cost k and entered and positioned themselves in the CSR segment) then compete among themselves and with all other rms present in the standard and dirty good market. As it will be detailed below, competition among 'active' rms is assumed to take one of three possible forms: (i) price competition a la Bertrand, (ii) collusive price competition, and (iii) imperfect market competition, an intermediate level of competition. The demand side of the model (consumer preferences, etc.) and the information structure (signals, etc.) are assumed identical as those in our benchmark model.
The timing of this model with rm competition in CSR is thus as follows:
1. Any rm decides whether or not to enter into the 'active' market by incurring an entry cost k. If a rm does not incur such a cost, it continues to produce the 'dirty' standard good (at a zero marginal cost, price equal zero, and obtaining zero pro ts).
2. Nature chooses the type of rm, namely, the level of the xed cost F of investing in the clean technology, for each rm that entered the \active" segment. Firms' types, F i , i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng are identically and independently distributed according to the binary distribution function f e ; 1 e g:
3. Each rm in the 'active' market (the CSR segment) chooses the technology with which it is going to produce, t 2 fC; Dg. Notice that since in the present analysis there are only two types of xed costs, F = 0 and F ! 1, those active rms with F = 0 will always invest and sell a good produced with the clean technology, whereas those rms with F ! 1 will never do so. 21 This model of competition is devised for endogenizing the number of rms. In the accompanying working paper Calveras and Ganuza (2015) we analyze an alternative competitive model that is more related to the previous monopoly model. In particular, this alternative model takes the number of active rms in the CSR segment as given (without an entry stage) and includes strategic types. This model has a large multiplicity of equilibria, but focusing on the symmetric pure strategy equilibria we show that the main message of the monopoly case is robust to the introduction of competition: for a given number of rms, the better information there is regarding the rm's CSR practices, the more incentives rms have to invest in the clean technology.
4. Nature chooses a (potentially di erent) signal s 2 fs C ; s D g for each rm on the technology used (according to information structure). All consumers receive the same signal for each rm, and all rms also observe all signals.
5. Each rm sets its price p.
6. Each consumer decides whether to buy or not from one of the 'active' rms and, if so, from which one. The alternative is to buy the standard good from the competitive fringe (at zero price and deriving zero utility).
7. Pro ts for all rms are realized.
As usual, the game is solved backwards. Demand is determined precisely as before, where consumers choose between buying a CSR good or a standard dirty one. Consumers receive signals, s 2 fs C ; s D g, over the investments decisions of the n active rms. Given the information structure and that rms' types are independently and identically distributed, consumer's beliefs on the technology chosen by a rm given the signal received are (remember now there are only two types of xed costs): Pr(Cjs D ) = 0 and Pr(Cjs C ) = Pr(s C jC) e Pr(s C jC) e +Pr(s C jD)(1 e ) = e e +(1 )(1 e ) :
Market competition: prices
It is necessary to determine the way in which all 'active' rms that paid the sunk cost k (positioned in the CSR market segment) compete among them. Notice that given our information structures, dirty signals s D are fully informative. Then, when consumers receive a dirty signal s D from one rm, their willingness to pay for that rm's product is zero and, consistently with the previous section, rm's price and pro t equal zero. It is thus left to determine pricing by those rms that are positively perceived by consumers by having generated a clean signal s C . To simplify the analysis, we consider three market structures: (i) Bertrand price competition, (ii) price collusion at the monopoly price, and (iii) imperfect competition.
Bertrand price competition Assume the active rms compete in prices a la Bertrand.
This implies that rms with a clean signal s C will compete in prices until prices equal marginal costs, namely zero; thus, whenever two or more rms yield a clean signal, prices for these rms will be zero, obtaining zero pro ts (minus the entry cost k). It should then be clear that the only way in which a rm obtains positive pro ts is the case in which its signal is the only clean signal in the market. In this case, the rm will set the monopoly price of the benchmark model.
Price collusion
The other pricing scenario which we consider is the one in which all active rms with a clean signal s C collude in prices by agreeing to the monopoly price of the benchmark model. In this case, an 'active' rm with a clean signal will obtain positive pro ts determined by the monopoly pro ts and its market share (its demand will be the monopoly demand divided by the number of rms with a clean signal).
Imperfect competition. We consider in a reduced form an intermediate framework between the two previous ones. Assume that rms with a clean signal s C face a discontinuous demand: a proportion (1 ) of their potential consumers cannot buy products of their competitors (for instance, because they cannot reach them or are not aware of them, or they are loyal consumers), while the remaining are able to take advantage of Bertrand price competition. We can thus interpret as the degree or intensity of market competition.
Entry
Proceeding backwards, it is left to determine entry, namely, how many rms will position into the CSR market segment by incurring in the sunk cost k. Notice that the entry decision is taken by a rm prior to learning its actual type, but anticipating the type of competition that will take place. Then, the entry decision depends on the gross ex-ante expected pro ts of entering the market, (n), which is a function of n (the number of rms that will be present in the CSR market segment), and the type of competition. More precisely, a rm decides to position itself in the CSR market segment if these ex-ante gross pro ts (n) minus the entry cost k are larger than zero (the pro ts of producing the dirty homogenous good), i.e. if (n) k 0.
Competition a la Bertrand Consider rst the scenario in which after entry rms with a clean signal s C will compete a la Bertrand. Market pro ts are going to be zero unless the rm is the only one to generate a clean signal. The probability of such an event is the probability that this rm will get a clean signal ( e + 1 e (1 ), because it invested or by luck) times the probability that no other active rm will do so (
, no other rm that entered gets to be of the type F = 0, and no rm with F ! 1 is lucky and generates the clean signal).
Then, expected gross pro ts are the probability of ending up being a monopolist times the pro ts in such a case, namely:
Plugging Pr(Cjs C ) = e e +(1 )(1 e ) into the expression and simplifying, we obtain
Therefore, rms enter as long as (n) k 0; and the equilibrium number of rms n in the market is given by the following expression:
It is easy to see that the left hand side is increasing in and decreasing in n (since 1 e < 1), which implies that n is increasing in and decreasing in k: 22 ' 23 Price collusion Consider now that, instead of competing a la Bertrand, all active rms with a clean signal collude in prices by agreeing to the monopoly price (as the one in the benchmark 22 We treat n as a continuous variable for simplifying the presentation. If we replace the market equilibrium condition for its discrete version, i.e h 1 e i n 1 e k > h 1 e i n e , none of our results and intuitions change. 23 An alterntive model with competition and strategic types analyzed in Calveras and Ganuza (2015) delivers a similar result. In a setting with a given number of rms and competition a la Bertrand, a market with more competition (larger n) requires better information on rms' practices for keeping their incentives to be CSR. model) and then divide the demand equally among themselves. Then, the pro ts of an arbitrary rm entering into the CSR market segment are determined by the probability of generating a clean signal e + 1 e (1 ) and the expected number of active rms with a clean signal with whom it will share the market at the monopoly price, namely:
i Pr(X = 0) + Pr(X = 1) 1 2 + ::: + Pr(X = n 1)
where Pr(X = x) is the probability of having x rms out of the other n 1 with a clean signal.
Notice that X follows the binomial distribution with parameters n 1 and p e + 1 e (1 ), which we write X B(n 1; p). The probability of getting exactly x successes (clean signals in n 1 trials) is given by the probability mass function:
where
into the expression and using the de nition of the binomial distribution, we can rewrite the ex-ante gross pro t function as As in the previous case, rms decide to enter as long as (n) k 0; and thus the equilibrium number of rms n in the market is given by the following expression:
The left hand side is increasing in and decreasing in n , which implies that n is increasing in and decreasing in k:
Imperfect competition Assume now that a rm with a clean signal s C has monopoly power over a proportion (1 ) of their potential consumers, while faces Bertrand price competition for the remaining part of the demand. Following above results, a rm's gross expected pro ts will be determined by the probability of getting a clean signal ( e + 1 e (1 )), times a convex combination of the pro ts of the Bertrand segment and the monopoly segment:
Using Pr(Cjs C ) = e e + (1 )(1 e ) and the entry-condition, (n) k 0; we can characterize the equilibrium number of rms n in the market:
For the same argument than above, n is increasing in and decreasing in k:
we can now analyze how the degree (intensity) of competition a ects the equilibrium number of rms in the market. The right hand side is increasing in , which implies that the number of active rms in equilibrium is decreasing with : A nice implication of these results is that in a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given level of CSR (or 'green') rms.
The following proposition summarizes the role of information accuracy and intensity of market competition on CSR in a framework where the number of rms that can be CSR is endogenous:
Proposition 6 1. In more transparent markets (larger ) a larger number of rms will be socially responsible.
2. A higher intensity of market competition (higher ) implies that fewer rms are socially responsible.
3. In a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given number of CSR rms.
The rise in the importance of the phenomena of corporate social responsibility that has taken place in the last 15 or 20 years is inextricably linked to both an increase in the "consciousness" of markets (consumers, investors, workers) with regards to social and environmental issues, as well as to an increase in the transparency of market and non-market behavior of rms. Our focus in this paper has been precisely the study of the role that informational issues play in the promotion of CSR and, more speci cally, in the incentives that rms (a single rm as a monopolist, or rms in competition for 'conscious' consumers) have to invest in CSR business practices.
We assume there is a demand by consumers of a good with some CSR credence attribute (e.g., that the good is produced with a green or clean technology). Since such an attribute is not directly observable by consumers, demand and willingness to pay must depend on consumer's perception of the rm which, in turn, depends on some indirect information: in our set-up a signal that all consumers receive regarding the technology used by the rm. This signal is a reduced form modelling of the information that consumers receive about rms (e.g., through media). The rst result in our paper is quite intuitive: the better the information available to consumers, the more consumers are willing to pay for a good labeled as CSR (or 'green') and, accordingly, the more incentives rms have to adopt such a mode of production. 24 A higher accuracy of information available to consumers impacts positively both a monopolist CSR rm as well as competing rms in search of 'conscious' consumers. It is also true, however, that markets with a stronger degree (intensity) of competition will show a lower level of CSR (a smaller number of CSR rms in our modelling).
We acknowledge that the availability to consumers of information on the rm's practices is endogenous, namely, it is dependent on many actors' behavior. Such information is dependent not only on media behavior (the press, TV), but also other stakeholder's behavior, such as NGOs, activist shareholders and institutional shareholders, nancial analysts, and the information provided by the rm itself. Hence, we have endogenized the information available to consumers by allowing the rm to manipulate such information in a way that decreases the accuracy of the signal received. As a result of such manipulation capability, an equilibrium with socially responsible business practices becomes less likely: since consumers know that the information they have is likely to have been manipulated, they are less willing to pay a premium for the supposedly CSR product, and then a rm has less incentives to adopt the (more costly) CSR mode of production.
More surprising, though, is that some of these rms end-up worse-o because of their possibility to manipulate the information provided to consumers. This is so because such manipulation possibility destroys a CSR equilibrium in which the rm provided the good with the CSR credence attribute, and the consumer paid a premium price. As a consequence of the decrease in pro ts due to the manipulation possibilities, these rms (the ones that, absent the possibility to manipulate, would invest in social responsibility) would favor any measure that ties their hands and impedes them to manipulate the information; in other words, a measure that increases the transparency in the market regarding the rm's mode of production. Alternative institutional arrangements might play such role, such as, for instance, transparency regulation by the public sector (e.g., the European Union Directive 1999/94/EC which requires car makers to inform consumers on fuel economy and CO2 emissions of each car), or a decentralized solution to increase market transparency such as the observed partnerships between rms and NGOs (e.g., GAP and the NGO Verit e; the multinational fruit company Chiquita and Rainforest Aliance, Starbucks and Conservation International, etc.). While acknowledging that such partnerships may serve several purposes, we provide a rationale behind such alliances in the way that an independent and reputable NGOs may be capable of credibly communicating consumers that the information, even though maybe still noisy, has not been manipulated by the rm. When such partnerships become available to rms, we show there exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies in which such partnerships are formed with the purpose of rms to credibly and visibly commit in the eyes of consumers to not manipulate the information they receive. In such a way, transparency in the market is increased, and a socially responsible equilibrium becomes more
likely. An interesting avenue for future research, one at which we already hint at the paper with some discussion, is about the comparative advantage of transparency regulation and alternative decentralized institutional arrangements in order to increase market transparency, such as, for instance, a rm-NGO partnership.
A Proofs
Proof of lemma 1: As H( ) = 1 H( ) is logconcave, (p; s) is quasiconcave on p (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005) and the optimal price is given by the rst order condition:
As is a feature of the distribution H( ) and it is independent of Pr (C j s) and p, we can characterize the optimal price and rm's posterior pro ts as functions of :
Proof of lemma 2:
i) The expected pro ts of the strategic type in the CSR equilibrium are:
If we take the derivative over the accuracy of the signal , we obtain:
ii) The expected pro ts of the strategic type in the NCSR equilibrium are:
Proof of Proposition 1: The characterization of the equilibrium depends on both conditions stated in the main text:
Notice that as 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Total welfare. Consider the CSR equilibrium. Total welfare W CSR does not depend on prices but on the nal allocation of the goods and the costs incurred in their production. Then, since in this equilibrium both the strategic type (which occurs with probability ) and the type F = 0 (which occurs with probability 1 2 ) invest in the clean technology, total welfare is
where when the good is produced with the clean technology (which happens with probability Similarly, consider the NCSR equilibrium, with total welfare
Then, it is easy to compute W CSR W N CSR = (W b F ) > 0 since we are assuming b F < < W .
Pro ts. Exante rm pro ts in the CSR equilibrium are CSR =
F ; namely, the probability of obtaining a clean signal multiplied by its value, minus the expected cost of investing in the clean technology (which is relevant only for the strategic type).
2 (1 ) into the previous expression, and simplifying, we obtain CSR = Again we obtain that CS CSR CS N CSR = (W ) > 0: This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition
The proposition follows for the previous results and the equilibrium conditions.
Proof of proposition 4:
As the non strategic type with F = 1 will manipulate, the value of a good signal, CSR (s C ); decreases from
Moreover, manipulation make more attractive to deviate since the good signal is more likely, then the condition of the equilibrium becomes:
This condition is more di cult to be satis ed than
Proof of lemma 3: Take for example the limit rm with xed cost equal to 0 (1+ ) 2 0 (1 ) + "; the payo of this rm in the CSR equilibrium is (1+ ) 2 (1 ) 0 (1+ ) 2 0 (1 ) which is higher than its payo in the NCSR equilibrium
(1 )
The last inequality, follows from
) :
which simpli es to
And nally
This is true given that 1 > 0 .
Proof of Proposition 5:
The belief system is consistent with the strategies played in equilibrium. Then we have to check that such strategies are optimal given the belief system and the conditions established in the Proposition 5. First, notice that 
In order words, if the condition of the CSR equilibrium is satis ed, the condition for separating equilibrium also holds. This concludes the proof.
B Continuous types model
We keep our benchmark model, but we replace the three types set (with F = 0, F = b F and As types lower than b f invest in the clean technology and higher types do not, applying the bayes rule we obtain:
Plugging this expression in the equation that characterizes b f we obtain:
If = 1 (i.e. perfect information) the rm invests if f , while if = 0 the rm never invests. If G(f ) is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] we can explicitly characterize the cut-o type and, accordingly, the percentage of rms that decide to be SR:
Then, it is easy to see that b f is increasing in and , which implies that propositions 1 and 3 also hold with continuous xed cost types.
C Pooling equilibrium
In this appendix we analyze the case in which the commitment decision is costless, c = 0: In such a case the only perfect bayesian equilibria are pooling equilibria.
Lemma 4
If c = 0, the perfect bayesian equilibria in pure strategies must be a pooling equilibria in which all types of rms follow the same strategy regarding the commitment decision.
Proof: In order to rule out the partially separating equilibrium (given that we have two possible strategies and three types) we have to consider several cases. v) Consider now that the strategic type chooses a di erent strategy than the other two, there are two possibilities. First, the strategic type chooses a clean technology, then P (Cjs C (s C ; d b F )) = 1 and F = 0 would prefer to mimic the strategic type, as in the last case of i). Second, the strategic type chooses a dirty technology but then, the posterior belief will be P (Cjs C (s C ; d b F )) = 1 and its pro ts will be 0. In this case, the strategic type would be better by deviating and by mimicking the other two types, as in case iii).
Finally, the pooling equilibrium on any strategy C and N C is always an equilibrium because we can have arbitrary believes out of the equilibrium path, in particular 1 (s C ; :) = 1:
The intuition why a separating equilibrium does not exist is as follows. There does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the type F = 1 chooses a di erent strategy than the other two types since, independently of the realization of the signal, it would not get any pro ts and mimicking the type F = 0 generates positive pro ts. In summary, F = 1 has incentives to be with the other two types. For the opposite argument, there does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the type F = 0 chooses a di erent strategy than the other two types, since the other two types have incentives to mimic F = 0. Finally, there does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the strategic type chooses a di erent strategy than the other two types: the strategic type, depending on the parameters, has the same preferences than F = 0 or F = 1, which implies that the previous arguments apply. 25 Focusing thus in the pooling equilibria, we can construct two pooling equilibria in which the three types choose either to commit or not to commit, beliefs on the equilibrium path are the priors and consumers have a belief outside of the equilibrium path (1 j d; s) = 1 (namely, a deviating rm is F = 1). However, it seems less natural an equilibrium in which \good" rms lose the opportunity to di erentiate through commitment. In fact, as we state in the next proposition, this equilibrium may not pass the intuitive criterium of Cho-Kreps. 25 The previous arguments and Proposition 4 depend on the fact that we assume that it is costless to commit to not manipulate. It is very intuitive to see that if we introduced a cost of committing, separation equilibria might arise. For example, consider a constelation of parameters such that rms with F = 0 and F = b F would commit to not manipulate, whereas a rm with F = 1 would not commit. Notice that such an equilibrium would have (1 j N Co; s) = 1.
Proposition 7
The pooling equilibrium in which all types of rms follow a commitment strategy is the only perfect bayesian equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterium of Cho-Kreps for all parameter values.
Proof: The pooling equilibrium in which all the types choose Co; posterior believes on equilibrium path are equal to priors believes and the belief out of the equilibrium path is 1 (N C; :) = 1; is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and satis es the intuitive criterion of Cho-Kreps. The rst part, is direct because independently of the realization of the signal, the pro ts of the rm when choosing N C are 0. Then, all the types prefer Co to N C: Moreover, this equilibrium satis es the Cho-Kreps criterion since the maximum payo of type F = 1 are achieved with N C and 0 (N C; :) = 1; then we cannot rule out the belief 1 (N C; :) = 1.
The pooling equilibrium in which all the types choose N Co; posterior believes on equilibrium path are equal to priors believes and the belief out of the equilibrium path is 1 (Co; :) = 1; is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium but for some parameters does not satisfy the intuitive criterion of Cho-Kreps. In particular, consider that parameters are such that the strategic type chooses a clean technology and does not have incentives to manipulate. Then, the equilibrium payo of the F = 1 type on the equilibrium path is The pooling equilibria requires beliefs out of the equilibrium path that give more weight (probabilities) to the types that will produce with a dirty technology. However, the intuitive criterium of Cho & Kreps allows us to show that good types (F = 0 and strategic types producing with the clean technology) may nd it optimal to deviate from the pooling equilibrium in which all the types choose N C: The intuitive criterium establishes two conditions to eliminate a perfect bayesian equilibrium. First, that the type that deviates obtains larger pro ts out of the equilibrium path if it is identi ed for his true type. In our case, if for example, type F = 0 would obtain larger pro ts by choosing Co and being identi ed as type F = 0, that it is obtaining with N C and pooled with F = 1:
Second, and applying the requirement to our model, the bad types (F = 1 and strategic types producing with the dirty technology) may obtain larger pro ts in the equilibrium path (N Co) that out of the equilibrium path for all possible beliefs. In our case, this implies that they must obtain larger pro ts by being pooled with the good types and having the opportunity to manipulate than by commiting to not manipulate (obtaining with lower probability a low signal) with the more favorable beliefs (0 j Co; s C ) = 1 (that is, being taken as an F = 0), this second condition is satis ed only if manipulating is a su ciently attractive, that is, if 0 is large enough.
There exist alternative institutional arrangements to cope with the problems derived from the possibility of manipulating the ifnormation by the rm. Namely, we have mentioned transprency regulaiton by the public sector and self-commitment by the rm through external agents. The analysis in the previous subsection allows us to discuss the interaction between such institutional arrangements in the following corollary:
Corollary 8 Transparency regulation that reduces the distance between and 0 is a strategic substitute of self-commitment to transparency by rms.
Proof: This is due to the fact that the condition for ruling out the pooling equilibrium on N C, > (1 ) , is likely to be satis ed when 0 is large, since both sides of the inequality are decreasing.
We do this statement in the sense that only when 0 is large enough, we can guarantee that the only equilibrium in pure strategies (that satis es the intuitive criterium) is the pooling equilibrium in which all types of rms follow a commitment strategy.
